CASE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED WHERE COMMONWEALTH COMPLIED WITH INTERSTATE AGREEMENT DETAINERS PROCESS TO ACHIEVE DEFENDANT’S RETURN TO PA
The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Plowden, No. 143 WDA 2015 (March 8, 2017), holding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that (1) the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence pursuant to Rule 600 in procuring Plowden for trial and (2) the circumstances occasioning the delay in trial were not beyond the Commonwealth’s control.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed from an Order entered January 6, 2015 by the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, granting a motion filed by Tyshawn Plowden pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 600, and dismissing the charges against Plowden with prejudice.
The Commonwealth contended the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion because the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in prosecuting Plowden, who was incarcerated in another state outside the control of the Commonwealth.
It is generally held that Rule 600 is tolled where the Commonwealth shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has acted with due diligence in seeking extradition to bring the defendant to trial.
A criminal defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction is unavailable within the meaning of Rule 600 if the Commonwealth demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due diligence in attempting to procure the defendant’s return for trial. Due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.
Here, the Superior Court, en banc, found that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that (1) the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence in procuring Plowden for trial and (2) the circumstances occasioning the delay in trial were not beyond the Commonwealth’s control.
To the contrary, the Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth demonstrated affirmatively that it proceeded pursuant to the Interstate Agreement Detainers (“IAD”) process to achieve Plowden’s timely return and continued to communicate with New York authorities, and that its goal was foiled by circumstances over which it had no control. Because there was no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth to evade the fundamental trial rights of Plowden, the 90-day delay during the period of the IAD process at issue was therefore excludable from the Rule 600 calculation.
Accordingly, the trial court’s Order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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