The PA Commonwealth Court recently held that because Petitioner’s ten-year registration period should have expired sometime in 2008 and there were no allegations that he committed any new sexual offenses since his 1991 Texas conviction and he successfully completed his registration period prior to the December 2012 effective date of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), he was not subject to the lifetime reporting requirements under SORNA. T.L. Jackson v. Commonwealth of PA, 388 M.D. 2014 (PA Cmmwlth July 7, 2016).

In October 1990, Jackson was charged with violation of Texas law involving Indecency with a Child by Contact. On or about April 12, 1991, Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of Indecency with a Child by Contact and was sentenced to ten years’ probation. In May 1993, Jackson violated his probation by failing, inter alia, to report to the probation office and pay court costs. He was subsequently resentenced to ten years imprisonment, for which he served five years in prison and the remaining five years on parole. Jackson was discharged from all supervision on January 15, 2003.

Whether the PSP’s decision not to credit Jackson for the approximately six years he spent registering out-of-state is arbitrary and not reasonably related to the object of the Commonwealth’s sex offender legislation and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution?

Jackson successfully completed his registration period prior to SORNA’s effective date in December 2012 and he was not subject to the act. Therefore, the PSP erred in mandating that he continue to register as a sexual offender under SORNA.

As the Commonwealth Court framed it, the question was whether there a rational basis for requiring Jackson to register for a lifetime when a Pennsylvania offender who committed the same act, on the same day, and who registered for ten years with the PSP was not subject to a lifetime registration requirement under SORNA because he was considered to have completed his registration period prior to the law’s enactment. To put it even more simply, the Commonwealth Court framed the question as whether there was a rational basis for this difference in registration requirements based solely on the fact that Jackson’s offense occurred in another state.

The PA Supreme Court previously held that the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the respective Megan’s Law reporting statutes was not retribution, but to protect public safety. In carrying out that purpose, the General Assembly in Megan’s Law II classified individuals differently based on their perceived potential danger to the community. Specifically, sexually violent predators were required to register for their lifetime whereas individuals who were convicted of lesser offenses, referred to as merely sexual offenders, were only required to register for ten years.

The Commonwealth Court noted that Jackson was classified a sexual offender when he moved to Pennsylvania in 2004 and the PSP even admitted that he was only required to register for ten years. Further, the Commonwealth Court assumed then that the PSP did not consider Jackson to pose the same risk to the citizens of the Commonwealth as individuals classified as sexually violent predators who were required to register for life. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court concluded that because Pennsylvania sexual offenders who completed their ten-year registration period before SORNA was enacted are not required to register for the rest of their lives, requiring Jackson to now register for the rest of his life under SORNA and not count all the years that he has registered in other states, merely because his offense was committed in another state, is not reasonably related to enhancing public safety and welfare.