STATE CANNOT PROSECUTE FOR CONDUCT ARISING FROM SAME BEHAVIOR THAT LED TO FEDERAL CONVICTION WHERE THE STATUTES TARGET THE SAME HARM OR EVIL
The Pa. Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Gross, No. 375 EDA 2016 (February 28, 2017), holding that the Commonwealth is prohibited from prosecuting Gross because it failed to show the law under which it sought to prosecute her was designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the federal law for which she was convicted that arose out of the same conduct.
Gross fraudulently obtained a firearm that was ultimately used in a series of violent crimes by her paramour. A criminal complaint was filed, charging Gross with criminal conspiracy; firearms not to be carried without a license; possession of firearm prohibited; and, lending or giving of firearms prohibited. This matter wound its way through the PA State Court system; but, before it was disposed of, the federal government alleged that Gross lied in connection with her acquisition of the firearm and aided and abetted her paramour in possessing a firearm when she knew him to be prohibited from doing so. Gross ultimately pled guilty in federal court to making false statements to a federal firearms licensee.
Ultimately, Gross’ state charges wound their way back to the trial court. Prior to trial, Gross asked the trial court to dismiss her state prosecution, based on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied her request and she appealed. Her claim on appeal was that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the information against her even though it arose out of the same conduct for which she was already prosecuted, convicted and sentenced by the federal government.
The Superior Court began its analysis by stating that when a defendant asserts that a state prosecution is barred by a prior federal action, the determination is governed by Section 111 of the PA Crimes Code. This Section allows that when conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under certain circumstances.
The courts of this Commonwealth have consistently held that there are three relevant inquiries to be made when analyzing a case pursuant to Section 111. The first inquiry is whether or not the prosecution which the Commonwealth proposes to undertake involves the same conduct for which the individual was prosecuted by the other jurisdiction. If the answer to this question is yes, then the Court must determine whether each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required by the other, and whether the law defining the state offense is designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining the other jurisdiction’s offense. If the Commonwealth cannot satisfy both of these requisites, then the prosecution may not proceed.
In Gross’ case, the trial court concluded – and the Commonwealth did not dispute – that the Commonwealth sought to prosecute Gross in state court for the same conduct that led to her federal conviction. Accordingly, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth to lift the statutory bar against prosecution by first demonstrating that each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required by the other and, secondly, demonstrating that the law defining the state offense was designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining the federal offense to which Gross pled guilty.
The Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth was able to satisfy the first requirement by showing that each prosecution required proof of a fact not required by the other. However, the Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the law under which it sought to prosecute Gross was designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining Gross’ federal offense.
To make this this conclusion, the Superior Court reviewed the standard to be used in when determining whether a second prosecution is not permitted in Pennsylvania. Specifically, the Court found that a second prosecution and imposition of punishment for the same offense will not be permitted unless it appears from the record that the interests of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted and imposed punishment are substantially different. In other words, if it appears that the interests of the Commonwealth were not sufficiently protected in the initial prosecution, then a second prosecution and imposition of additional punishment in Pennsylvania will be allowed.
In analyzing whether the trial court applied the appropriate standard in Gross’ case, the Superior Court determined that while the purpose of the federal statute prohibiting false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm may arguably be, as the trial court found, to prevent fraud in connection with the purchasing of firearms from licensed dealers, the analysis requires that the court take a broader view of the harm or evil to be prevented by the law.
Applying this broader analysis, the Superior Court reached a different conclusion than the trial court, concluding instead that both the federal and state statutes under which Gross was prosecuted are designed to vindicate substantially the same interests, i.e., the protection of the public by prohibiting the transfer of certain firearms to various categories of individuals.
Accordingly, because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the law under which it sought to prosecute Gross was designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining Gross’ federal offense, the trial court erred in holding that the “interest test” was satisfied.
Having failed to satisfy both requisites to lifting the bar to prosecution, the Commonwealth was thus prohibited from proceeding with its prosecution of Gross.
CASE LINK: http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A27018-16o%20-%2010300867416201202.pdf?cb=1
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