U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS APPLY TO STUN GUNS AND ALL OTHER “BEARABLE ARMS”
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided the case of JAIME CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS No. 14–10078 (March 21, 2016), holding that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding and that this Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.
FACTS
Caetano possessed a stun gun to protect herself from an abusive former boyfriend. Her possession of the stun gun that may have saved her life made her a criminal in her home state of Massachusetts. When police discovered her in possession of the weapon, she was arrested, tried, and convicted. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a stun gun “is not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection” because it was “not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.” The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court offered three explanations to support its holding that the Second Amendment does not extend to stun guns: (1) The Court explained that stun guns are not protected because they were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment; (2) The Court concluded that stun guns were dangerous per se at common law and “unusual” because they are “a thoroughly modern invention”; and, (3) the Court found nothing in the record to suggested that stun guns are readily adaptable to use in the military.
ISSUE
Whether the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding (e.g. – stun guns)?
HOLDING
Stun guns are plainly “bearable arms” and the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.
REASONING
The U.S. Supreme Court decided the matter, per curiam. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, authored the concurring opinion. Therein, he wrote that the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “defies our decision in [District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008)], which rejected as ‘bordering on the frivolous’ the argument ‘that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment.’ The decision below also does a grave disservice to vulnerable individuals like Caetano who must defend themselves because the State will not.”
The concurrence reasoned that stun guns are plainly “bearable arms” and that the term, as set forth in Heller includes any “weapon of offence” or “thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands,” that is “carried . . . for the purpose of offensive or defensive action.”
In addressing the reasons provide by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for upholding Caetano’s conviction, the concurrence determined that the lower court’s decision was simply inconsistent with Heller. First, Heller clearly stated that the Second Amendment extends to arms that were not in existence at the time of the founding. Second, by concluding that stun guns were “unusual” and equating the term “unusual” with “in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” the lower court’s reasoning on this issue failed for the same reasons as the first. Lastly, since Heller rejected the proposition “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected,” the final reason provided by the lower court failed as well.
Perhaps the most telling comment from Justice Alito relating to the right of self defense and power of the states to curtail that right came when the Justice wrote “If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect [us], then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than about keeping them safe.”
The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/14-10078#CONCUR_3-3
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